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Abstract. We consider the problem of basing Oblivious Transfer (OT)
and Bit Commitment (BC), with information theoretic security, on seem-
ingly weaker primitives. We introduce a general model for describing such
primitives, called Weak Generic Transfer (WGT). This model includes
as important special cases Weak Oblivious Transfer (WOT), where both
the sender and receiver may learn too much about the other party’s in-
put, and a new, more realistic model of noisy channels, called unfair
noisy channels. An unfair noisy channel has a known range of possible
noise levels; protocols must work for any level within this range against
adversaries who know the actual noise level.
We give a precise characterization for when one can base OT on WOT.
When the deviation of the WOT from the ideal is above a certain thresh-
old, we show that no information-theoretic reductions from OT (even
against passive adversaries) and BC exist; when the deviation is below
this threshold, we give a reduction from OT (and hence BC) that is
information-theoretically secure against active adversaries.
For unfair noisy channels we show a similar threshold phenomenon for bit
commitment. If the upper bound on the noise is above a threshold (given
as function of the lower bound) then no information-theoretic reduction
from OT (even against passive adversaries) or BC exist; when it is below
this threshold we give a reduction from BC. As a partial result, we give
a reduction from OT to UNC for smaller noise intervals.
1 Introduction
A 1 out of 2 Oblivious transfer (1-2 OT) protocol is one by which
a sender with 2 bits b0, b1 as input can interact with a receiver with
a bit c as input. Ideally, the sender should learn nothing new from
the protocol, whereas the receiver should learn bc and nothing more.
Several variants of OT exist, but it does not matter much which one
we consider, as they are almost all equivalent (see e.g. [8]).
A bit commitment scheme is a pair of protocols Commit and
Open executed by two parties, a commiter, C, and a receiver, R.
First, C and R execute Commit, where C has a bit b as input; R
either accepts that a commitment has taken place or rejects. Ideally,
the receiver should learn no information about b from this. Later,
they may execute Open, after which R returns accept 1, accept 0 or
reject. We require our protocols to be correct, private and binding:
Correctness: If both parties follow the protocol, R should always
accept with the same value (b) that C wished to commit to.
Privacy: Committing to b reveals nothing to the receiver about b.
Binding: C cannot cause R to accept a commitment, and then be
able to execute Open so that R accepts a 1 and also be able to
execute Open so that R accepts a 0.
We have described the ideal requirements here. However, usually
when building such protocols, one accepts an error that can be made
negligibly small as a function of some security parameter k.
A great deal of work has gone into how to implement oblivious
transfer and bit commitment based on seemingly weaker primitives.
For example, a binary symmetric channel (BSC) is one that allows
a sender S to send a bit bS to a receiver R, such that a bit bR will
be received, which is not necessarily equal to bS. There is a constant
probability 0 < δ < 1/2 called the noise level of the channel such
that each time the channel is invoked, Pr(bS 6= bR) = δ. Another,
essentially equivalent formulation has S and R receiving random
bits bS and bR that are individually unbiased but correlated so that
Pr(bS 6= bR) = δ. Another equivalent formulation has a random bit
b transmitted to both parties through independent noisy channels.
One motivation for the last two formulations is that one might want
to implement noisy channels by a very weak broadcast source, such
as a satellite.
Crépeau and Kilian [9] showed that a BSC can be used to imple-
ment 1–2 OT with unconditional (information theoretic) security;
the efficiency of this reduction was later improved by Crépeau [6],
who also directly built a bit commitment scheme (indirectly, bit com-
mitment can be based on 1–2 OT).
The reductions given in [9, 6] rely on the fact that δ is known
exactly by each party. However, in real life it may be possible for
one party to surreptitiously alter the noise level of the channel. If
the noise is induced by a communications channel then it may be
possible to alter the mechanism (say by heating it up or cooling
it down), or change the way it uses the mechanism, to change the
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noise rate. For example, suppose the channel consists of two pieces
of optical fibre with a repeater station in between, a very common
case in practice. If one party has access to the data received by the
repeater station, then he can send and receive a cleaner signal than
the other party expects him to. In the case of a noisy broadcast
channel, an adversary might send a jamming signal or buy a more
sensitive antenna. Note that while it may be hard to hide the fact
that one has made a channel noisier, one can always hide the fact
that one has made it less noisy, simply by deliberately garbling ones
own messages and pretending to hear a more garbled version than
one already has heard.
Such “unfair advantages” are not always devastating for applica-
tions to cryptography: Maurer [15] shows that secure key exchange
between two parties with access to a random but noisy signal is pos-
sible, even in the presence of an enemy who can receive the signal
much more reliably than the honest players. However, this scenario
is a game for two parties who trust each other and want to be pro-
tected ”against the rest of the world”. It is natural to ask if we can
still make do with unfair channels in case of games between two mu-
tually distrusting parties. Unfortunately, the protocols of [9, 6] break
down in this scenario.
1.1 Our results
In this paper we propose a general model for two-party primitives
where a cheating player can get more information than an honest
one; we call this Weak Generic Transfer (WGT). We then consider
a number of important subcases and show when they can and cannot
be used as a basis for bit commitment and oblivious transfer.
We consider a family of Weak Oblivious Transfers, which are 1–
2 OT protocols with the following faults: with probability (at most)
p a cheating sender will learn which bit the receiver chose to receive,
and with probability q a cheating receiver will learn both of the
sender’s input bits. Note that the honest participants only receive
what they are supposed to receive; this extra information cannot be
relied on. We call such a protocol a (p, q)-WOT. We give tight results
for when one can reduce oblivious transfer to (p, q)-WOT.
In the statement of our results, when we use “reduction” we
mean a reduction that is information-theoretically secure against un-
bounded adversaries, where deviations from the ideal are negligible
in a given security parameter.
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Theorem 1. 1–2 OT and BC can be reduced to (p, q)-WOT iff p+
q < 1.
We also consider a still noisier model, denoted (p, q, ε)-WOT in
which with probability at most ε an honest receiver receives b̄c instead
of bc (i.e., the incorrect value); a cheating receiver is under no such
handicap. In this case, we prove positive an negative results that are
no longer tight.
Theorem 2. 1–2 OT can be reduced to (p, q, ε)-WOT, for the case
of passive adversaries, if p+q+2ε < .45. No reductions from 1–2 OT
or BC exist if p+ q + 2ε ≥ 1.
Passive adversaries, also known as “honest but curious” adver-
saries follow the protocol, but then try to use their view of the pro-
tocol execution to violate the security conditions.
Both theorems comprise a constructive result and an impossibil-
ity result. The constructive result of Theorem 1 generalizes a the-
orem of [9], which solves the special cases where either p or q is 0
(or negligible in the security parameter). Brassard/Crépeau [2] and
Cachin [4] consider a more general model of WOT, where the extra
information that an adversary learns is only specified by a general
information measure, but here again the weakness is one-sided: only
the receiver learns extra information. Prior to this work, few nontriv-
ial impossibility results of this type were known (see [14] for one such
result). These impossibility results hold even if security against pas-
sive cheating is required and the honest players are allowed infinite
computing power.
We note that one motivation for the study of these imperfect
protocols is that they provide easier to achieve steps for other re-
ductions. For example, our reduction from 1–2 OT to unfair noisy
channels first reduces (p, q, ε)-WOT to unfair noisy channels.
We finally consider unfair noisy channels (UNC). These channels
have parameters γ and δ, where γ, δ ≤ 1/2. The noise level p of this
channel is guaranteed to fall into the interval [γ, δ]. The protocol
must work for any p in this range; however the value of p is not
known to the honest players (but may be set within this range by
the adversary).
Theorem 3. For δ > 2γ(1 − γ), neither 1–2 OT nor BC may be
reduced to (γ, δ)-UNC. For δ < 2γ(1−γ) BC may be reduced to (γ, δ)-
UNC. Finally, 1–2 OT may be reduced to (γ, δ)-UNC if α3β3(1 −
ζ(1 − α)) > 0.775+ε(δ)
1−ε(δ) , where ε(δ) =
δ2










All of our impossibility results rely on a general simulation technique
that allows us to leverage the result that it is impossible to implement
1–2 OT (information-theoretically) given only a clear channel.
Our upper bounds for (p, q)-WOT and (p, q, ε)-WOT use some
reductions first used in [9]. The reduction from bit commitment to
(γ, δ)-UNC is based on the interactive hashing technique of [16]. The
precise hashing method of [16] doesn’t work for our application; in-
stead we use families of universal hash functions [10]. Hash functions
are ubiquitous in cryptography; two classic results on achieving pri-
vacy with universal hash functions are [13] and [1]. For the specifics
of our analysis we use bounds on their behaviour implied by the
results of [17].
Guide to the paper In Section 2 we give the general scenario
for weak generic transfer. In Section 3 we show impossibility results
for reducing 1–2 OT and bit commitment to (p, q)-WOT, (p, q, ε)-
WOT and (γ, δ)-UNC. In Section 4 we give reductions from 1–2 OT
(and hence bit commitment) to (p, q)-WOT and (p, q, ε)-WOT. In
Section 5 we give a reduction from bit commitment to (γ, δ)-UNC.
In Section 6 we in give a reduction from 1–2 OT to (γ, δ)-UNC.
2 The General Scenario: Weak Generic
Transfer
In order to show more clearly the basic properties we study, we start
with a general scenario that includes as special cases those primitives
we study in more detail later.
First, we describe a specification for standard two party primi-
tives, and then show how to augment these specifications to model
interesting deviations from the ideal behaviour of the protocol.
Initially, our scenario includes two players A,B that start with
private inputs xA, xB, respectively chosen from domains XA and XB
(the precise nature of these domains has no impact on the follow-
ing discussion). A specification for a standard two-party primitive
is a function output that maps (xA, xB) to a probability measure D
on YA × YB. When the primitive is executed with inputs (xA, xB),
D = output(xA, xB) is computed, (yA, yB) is chosen according to
D, yA is sent to A and yB is sent to B. This framework is pow-
erful enough to model primitives such as OT, 1–2 OT and binary
symmetric channels.
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To model the possibility that a primitive might inadvertently leak
information, we modify D to be a distribution (YA × ZA) × (YB ×
ZB); ((yA, zA), (yB, zB)) are sampled from D. If A is honest, then A
receives only yA, but if A is corrupt, it also receives zA; B behaves
symmetrically.
We can model passive (“honest but curious”) adversaries by sim-
ply specifying that an adversary Q ∈ {A,B} follows the protocol,
ignoring zQ, and then later learns what it can from the values of
zQ that is obtained. An active adversary may immediately use this
extra information in planning its next move.
We have modeled deviations from privacy; we now model devi-
ations in behaviour. Instead of having a single function output, we
have a (possibly infinite) set S of functions {output}, which contains
a “default” output0. When the protocol is executed, the adversary
has the option of choosing output from S; the protocol then behaves
as before. If there is no adversary, then the default output0 is used.
We say that S specifies a Weak Generic Transfer (WGT). We will
assume throughout that A and B have access to the WGT as a
black-box and can execute it independently as many times as they
wish.
A WGT may consist of a protocol where for instance a noisy
channel is used several times, and the protocol instructs one player
to send the same bit each time. An active cheater may choose not
to do so, and so he may behave in a way that is not consistent
with any legal input value, we say he inputs ?. We cannot require
in general that a WGT prevents such behaviour: this would require
that the cheater was committed to his input, and it is not clear a
priori that a WGT implies bit commitment (indeed some WGT’s
don’t, as we shall see). The best we can ask for in case of active
cheating is therefore that the following is satisfied:
– For any active cheating strategy followed by A (B), there exists
an input value x such that A (B) learns nothing more than what
is implied by the view of a passively cheating player with input
x.
If this is satisfied, we say that the WGT is secure against active
cheating (but note that the only security we ask for here is that
active cheating does not give any advantage over passive cheating).
It should be clear that (γ, δ)-UNC, (p, q)-WOT and (p, q, ε)-WOT
are special cases of WGT, where however it is only in the case of




The basic question we can ask is now: given a WGT, can we build
OT or BC based on it? It is easy to characterize a class of WGT’s
where the answer is no. For this, consider a case where we only
allow noiseless communication between A and B, and consider any
interactive protocol between them, of the following form:
– A starts with input xA, B starts with input xB.
– The players exchange a finite number of messages, and the proto-
col specifies at each stage a probabilistic algorithm for computing
the next message, given the input, and all message and random
coins seen so far.
– The view of a player (ViewA/ViewB) is as usual defined to be the
input, all messages received and all random coins used. At the
end, A and B compute their results, yA and yB from their views
by some function, i.e., yQ = fQ(ViewQ).
It is clear that any such protocol can be seen as a WGT by
letting zA = ViewA and zB = ViewB; this method for producing
yA, yB, zA, zB from xA, xB defines a probability measure D(xA, xB),
and we define just one output distribution function output which
always return D(xA, xB). Honest players will ignore anything except
for the result specified (YA, YB), but a passively cheating player may
use its entire view to compute extra information.
It is well known (and easy to see) that in a two-player scenario
with only noiseless communication, OT and BC with information
theoretic security is not possible, even if only passive cheating is
assumed, and players are allowed infinite computing power. Hence,
OT and BC are not reducible to the above WGT. We call such a
WGT trivial.
We now show how to “implement” (p, q, ε)-WOT in this manner,
where 2ε = 1− p− q. Player’s A Consider the following protocol, in
which A has input (b0, b1) and B has input c.
Protocol SimNoisyWOT[p, q]((b0, b1), c)
1. With probability q, A announces (b0, b1), B computes bc and the
protocol terminates; otherwise, A announces “pass”.
2. If A passes, then with probability p/(1− q), B sends c to A who
replies with bc; otherwise, B chooses bc at random.
By a straightforward case analysis, B learns both b0 and b1 with
probability q, A learns c with probability p and B receives an in-
correct value of bc with probability (1 − p − q)/2 = ε. Aside from
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easily simulated messages, such as “pass”, the view of each side cor-
responds to the view it could obtain from an actual run of a (p, q, ε)-
WOT primitive. Now, suppose we had an 1–2 OT protocol based
on a (p, q, ε)-WOT primitive. If we replaced each execution of the
(p, q, ε)-WOT by an execution of the SimNoisyWOT[p, q] primitive,
then the view of each party, taken in isolation, would be unchanged.
Since the security of 1–2 OT (at least against passive adversaries)
is defined solely by properties of player A’s view and by properties
of player B’s view, then the resulting protocol would remain secure
against passive adversaries. This would give a “mental 1–2 OT” pro-
tocol, information-theoretically secure against passive adversaries, a
contradiction. Similarly, there is no information-theoretically secure
(against both parties) mental bit commitment protocol, even if both
parties are guaranteed to follow the Commit protocol; we can in a
very similar way derive a contradiction.
The above argument implies the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There is no reduction from 1–2 OT or BC to (p, q, ε)-
WOT when p + q + 2ε ≥ 1, even if only security against passive
adversaries is required.
Remark: The simulation argument was for p + q + 2ε = 1. If p +
q+ 2ε > 1, choose ε′ = (1− p− q)/2 < ε; the impossibility argument
works for (p, q, ε′)-WOT. Note that a (p, q, ε′)-WOT primitive also
meets the requirements of a (p, q, ε)-WOT primitive, since its error
rate cannot be higher than ε, so a protocol that works for (p, q, ε)-
WOT must work for (p, q, ε′)-WOT as well.
We now consider the case of the noisy channel. Consider the
following purely mental protocol, in which A has input b.
Protocol SimUNC[γ](b)
1. A and B pick bA and bB respectively, such that Pr(bA = 1) =
Pr(bB = 1) = γ.
2. A sends b′ = b ⊕ bA to B. B computes b∗ = b′ ⊕ bB, denoting b∗
as the received bit, while no output is defined for A.
Consider a WGT which between honest players A and B is a
BSC with noise level δ, but where if A or B cheats passively, then
some extra information is available and allows to reduce the noise
level to γ, seen from the cheater’s point of view. Let us call this
a (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC. It is similar to but not the same as a (γ, δ)-
UNC. It immediately follows from the above protocol that a (γ, δ)-
PassiveUNC is trivial if δ = 2γ(1 − γ), and in fact in general if
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δ ≥ 2γ(1 − γ). And so there is no reduction of 1–2 OT or BC to
(γ, δ)-PassiveUNC in this case, not even if only passive security is
required.
Now, suppose we have a reduction from 1–2 OT to a (γ, δ)-UNC,
where δ = 2γ(1− γ), one secure against active attacks. We compare
the following two cases: In case 1 the reduction is attacked by an
adversary using the following active cheating strategy for a player
Q ∈ {A,B}: Q sets the noise level for the UNC to be γ always,
and then does the following: Whenever Q is supposed to send a bit
through the channel, Q first flips it with probability γ and then sends
it. Similarly, whenever Q receives a bit from the channel, Q flips it
with probability γ and acts as if that was the bit actually received. In
any other cases, Q follows the algorithm specified by the reduction.
Case 2: we execute the algorithm of the reduction substituting the
(γ, δ)-UNC by a (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC, and the adversary executes a
passive attack.
There is no difference between the cases from the honest player’s
point of view. Observe that in case 1, the adversary following the
strategy for Q knows as much about every bit sent and received by
his opponent as a passive adversary knows in case 2. So since the
reduction is secure in case 1, it must be secure in case 2, and we
have a contradiction. Essentially the same argument works for bit
commitment. So we have proved:
Lemma 2. There is no reduction from 1–2 OT or BC to (γ, δ)-UNC
when δ ≥ 2γ(1− γ).
This motivates the following interesting and open question: Which
non-trivial cryptographic primitives (if any) can be implemented based
on a WGT assuming only that it is non trivial?
4 Reducing 1–2 OT to (p, q)-WOT and
(p, q, ε)-WOT
We now look at the possibility of building a 1–2 OT or commitments
from a WOT. A reduction that accomplishes such a task can be
thought of as a program that gets the noise levels of a UNC or the
error probabilities of a WOT and a security parameter value k as
input and then instructs at each point in time one of the players
to either send a message in clear to the other player, or send a bit
through the noisy channel. Any information known to the player at
the time can be used, together with any number of random bits, to
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compute the next message to send. We make no assumption on the
amount of computation required.
4.1 Preliminaries
For a reduction of 1–2 OT to UNC, let Ic(k, δ, γ), Ibc(k, δ, γ),
Ib1−c(k, δ, γ) be the expected information that the sender obtains
about c, the receiver obtains about bc, and the receiver obtains about




Ic(k, δ, γ) = lim
k→∞
Ib1−c(k, δ, γ) = 0 and lim
k→∞
Ibc(k, δ, γ) = 1
For a reduction of 1–2 OT to (p, q)-WOT, we use the same defini-
tions, but with (δ, γ) replaced by (p, q).
For a reduction of bit commitment to UNC, let Ib(k, δ, γ) be the
expected information the receiver obtains about b in the Commit
protocol, and let p(k, δ, γ) be the probability that the binding con-




Ib(k, δ, γ) = lim
k→∞
p(k, δ, γ) = 0
We refer to [3] for a more sophisticated definition of 1–2 OT; our
protocols meet this definition as well.
The set of pairs for which a reduction works will be called the
range of the reduction. We will say that a reduction works efficiently
in a point in its range, if the required convergence in k is exponential,
and that the number of calls to the WOT or UNC is polynomial in
k. This is usually required for a reduction to be useful in practice,
but note that our impossibility results hold even if efficiency is not
required.
4.2 Some useful reductions
We use the following two known reductions for basing 1–2 OT on
(p, q)-WOT. The first is designed to reduce the chance the sender
(A) learns too much, while the second is targeted against the chance
of the receiver (B). Both reductions are assumed to be given as a
black-box a protocol W implementing (p, q)-WOT and work with
security parameter k. S-Reduce is taken from [9], while R-Reduce is
more or less folklore.
Protocol S-Reduce(k,W)
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1. Let b0, b1 resp. c be the input of the sender, resp. the receiver.
2. W is executed k times, with inputs (b0i, b1i), i = 1..k from the
sender and ci, i = 1..k from the receiver. Here, the b0i’s are uni-
formly chosen, such that b0 = ⊕ki=1b0i, b1i = b0i ⊕ b0 ⊕ b1 and the
ci’s are uniformly chosen such that c = ⊕ki=1ci.
3. The receiver computes his output bit as the xor of all bits received
in the k executions of W.
Protocol R-Reduce(k,W)
1. Let b0, b1 resp. c be the input of the sender, resp. the receiver.
2. W is executed k times, with inputs (b0i, b1i), i = 1..k from the
sender and ci, i = 1..k from the receiver. Here, ci = c, b01 ⊕ ...⊕
b0k = b0 and b11 ⊕ ...⊕ b1k = b1
3. The receiver computes the XOR of all bits received.
Lemma 3. When given k and a (p, q)-WOT W as input,
S-Reduce(k,W) implements a (pk, 1 − (1 − q)k)-WOT, and
R-Reduce(k,W) implements a (1− (1−p)k, qk)-WOT protocol. Both
protocol produce a WOT secure against active cheating if the given
WOT has this property.
Proof. First, it follows by inspection that the protocols allow the
players to compute the correct output. As for the error probabilities,
note that for S-Reduce a bad sender will learn c iff he learns all ci’s,
which happens with probability pk. On the other hand, a bad receiver
can learn both b0 and b1 if he learns just one pair (b0i, b1i), and this
happens with probability 1−(1−q)k. The case of R-Reduce is similar,
but with the chances of sender and receiver reversed. The last claim
follows easily: In S-Reduce security of W means that non of the
parties can gain anything from inputting ? to W . And if indeed no ?
is input to any W instance, R always behaves consistently with some
input c, namely the value c = ⊕ki=1ci. S can behave inconsistently
by choosing bad values of his bits, but this will not give him more
information on c. The case of R-Reduce is similar. ut
4.3 A reduction to (p, q)-WOT
Lemma 4 shows that the lower bound given by Lemma 1 is tight
when ε = 0. Lemmata 1 and 4 imply Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. There exists a reduction for building 1–2 OT from a
(p, q)-WOT, the range of which is {p, q| p + q < 1}. It works effi-
ciently for all points in its range.
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Proof. Suppose we start with a (p, q)-WOT W, and then apply
first R-Reduce(t,W) and then S-Reduce(t′,W). We will call this RS-
Reduce. It follows easily that this produces a ((1−(1−p)t)t′ , 1−(1−
qt)t
′
)-WOT. Of course, we can also apply S-Reduce first, and obtain
a (1− (1−pt)t′ , (1− (1−q)t)t′)-WOT. This will be called SR-Reduce.
The strategy for our reduction will be to apply repeatedly SR-
Reduce or RS-Reduce, in order to reduce as quickly as possible the
sum of the error probabilities. When given errors (p, q), we will apply
RS-Reduce if p ≤ q, and SR-Reduce otherwise. This will be called one
step in the reduction.
To analyse the effect of one step, define x = q, y = 1 − p when
p ≤ q, and x = p, y = 1− q otherwise. It follows that the difference
between the sum of the errors before and after the transformation is
f(t, t′, x, y) = (1− yt)t′ + 1− (1− xt)t′ − (1− y + x)
= (1− yt)t′ + y − ((1− xt)t′ + x)
The constraints we have on p, q imply that 1/2 < y < 1 and 1 −
y ≤ x < y. And we see that the progress we make is the difference
between the values of the function gt,t′(z) = (1− zt)t
′
+ z in points x
and y. The trick is now to choose, given x, y values of t, t′ such that
the above difference becomes numerically “large”. Note that since
we are subtracting the sum before the step from the sum after, the
difference is hopefully negative.
In any situation where the error probability sum before a step is
greater than 0.2, one of the following three cases apply:
y ≤ 0.8. This is a case where the smallest of p, q is at least 0.2, so
p, q are both ”large”. In this case, we choose t = t′ = 2. By
direct inspection of g2,2(x), one finds that for any x, y obeying
the restrictions, (g2,2(y)− g2,2(x))/(y− x) ≤ −0.1. Since y− x =
1− (p+ q), this shows that taking one step in this case multiplies
the distance from p + q to 1 by a factor of at least 1.1.
y > 0.8, x > .4. In this case, p + q is also ”large”, but this time
because one probability is small and the other is large. In this
case, we choose t = 2, t′ = 1. Again, by direct inspection, one
can verify that (g2,1(y) − g2,1(x))/(y − x) ≤ −0.2. By the same
argument as before, we see that in this case, the distance from
p+ q to 1 is multiplied by at least 1.2 by taking one step.
y > 0.8, x ≤ .4. In this case, both p and q and hence p + q are
”small”. We choose t = t′ = 2. Observe that for the large y,
g2,2(y) approaches y as y approaches 1, while for the small x,
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g2,2(x) approaches 1+x as x approaches 0. As a result, (g2,2(y)−
g2,2(x))/(1− y + x) ' −1 for small x and large y, and is in fact
less than −0.2 for the range specified. However, 1−y+x = p+q,
so we see that in this case, taking one step multiplies p + q by a
factor of at most 0.8.
As soon as we have an error probability sum which is at most 0.2,
we will start doing steps where we always have t = t′ = 4. In this
case one finds that is the error sum was s before a step is at most s2
after.
The overall strategy is now as follows: we first do whatever num-
ber of steps is necessary to bring the error probability sum below
0.2. We then do log2(k) steps, where k is the security parameter.
It follows from the above that the resulting error probability sum
is exponentially small in k, at most 0.2k. The number of calls we
make to the WOT is exponential in the number of steps, but since
we only take a logarithmic number of steps, the total number of calls
is polynomial in k. ut
Above, we have only considered p, q as being constants. However,
even if we have a case where p + q is a function of some parameter
n and converges polynomially to 1 in n, e.g. p(n) + q(n) = 1− 1/n,
the reduction in the proof still works in time polynomial in n: as
mentioned, the number of calls to the original WOT is exponential in
the number of steps taken, but since the convergence in the reduction
for large p+ q is exponential in the number of steps, we only have to
take a logarithmic number of steps before the error probability sum
falls below 0.2.
4.4 A reduction to (p, q, ε)-WOT
Lemma 1 shows that no reduction of 1-2-OT to (p, q, ε)-WOT exists
if p+ q+ 2ε ≥ 1 and this, even in the case of passive adversaries. We
show that if p+ q+ 2ε < 0.45, such a reduction does exist. We adapt
SR-Reduce to deal with transmission errors. We then characterize
triplets (p, q, ε) for which 1–2 OT is reducible to (p, q, ε)-WOT. The
reduction we consider assumes only passive adversaries.
The following error detection phase accepts parameter l > 0 and,
given a (p, q, ε)-WOT W, produces a (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT W ′ such that
ε′ < ε. As usual b0 and b1 denote the two bits to be transmitted and
c is the selection bit.
Protocol ErRed(l,W)
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1. A chooses q0, q1 ∈R {0, 1} and B chooses s ∈R {0, 1},
2. A sends l times the bits (q0, q1) through the (p, q, ε)-WOTW and
B selects the bit qs l times,
3. If B did not receive the same bits q̂s l times then A and B go to
Step 1.
4. B announces y = 0 if s = c and y = 1 otherwise.
5. A announces r0 and r1 such that by = r0⊕ q0 and b1−y = r1⊕ q1,
allowing B to compute bc = q̂s ⊕ rs.
We are now ready to describe a reduction of 1–2 OT to (p, q, ε)-
WOT which basically inserts calls to ErRed into SR-Reduce (and RS-
Reduce). Given positive integers l0, k, l1, k
′, l2 and a (p, q, ε)-WOT
W0, protocol SRε produces a new (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT W:
Protocol SRε(l0, k, l1, k
′, l2,W0)
– W ← ErRed(l2,R-Reduce(k′,ErRed(l1, S-Reduce(k,ErRed(l0,W0))))).
RSε(l0, k, l1, k
′, l2) is defined the same way except the calls to S-
Reduce and R-Reduce are permuted. Similarly to lemma 3, one can
characterize exactly the transformation taking place in a call to
SRε(l0, k, l, k
′, l′) for any parameters l0, k, l, k
′, and l′. In particular,
SRε(l0, k, l, k
′, l′) transforms a (p, q, ε)-WOT into a (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT
where p′ = 1 − (1 − (1 − (1 − p)l0)k)l1·k′·l2, q′ = 1 − (1 − (1 − (1 −
q)l0·k·l1)k
′
)l2 , and ε′ is of similar but slightly more complicated form.
A brute force analysis, using linear programming, shows that SRε
can be tuned to work at 45% the optimum (the sketch of the proof
can be found in [11]).
Lemma 5. Reduction SRε implements 1–2 OT given any (p, q, ε)-
WOT that satisfies p+ q + 2ε ≤ 0.45.
The above bound is not tight especially whenever one of p+ q and ε
is small. In particular, SRε works for all (p, q, 0) such that p+ q < 1
and for all (0, 0, ε) such that ε < 1
2
. A natural question arises: Is it
possible to use a different method for choosing parameters l0, k, l1, k
′
and l2 such that reduction SRε works also for p + q + 2ε  0.45?
Next theorem suggests that if one wants to get closer to the bound
p+ q + 2ε = 1, one has to find a different reduction.
Lemma 6. There exists triplets (p, q, ε) that satisfy p+q+2ε ≤ 0.70




Proof (sketch). Let p = q = 0.2 and ε = 0.15 be the parameters
of a WOT that satisfies p + q + 2ε = 0.7. It can be shown that
whatever the parameters l0, k, l1, k
′ and l2 are, SRε always generates
an intermediary simulatable triplet. ut
Lemma 6 suggests that introducing noise in a WOT might lead
to a primitive that is strictly weaker than 1–2 OT even for non-
simulatable but noisy WOT. However, the gap between the bounds
could be narrowed down by finding a better simulation and/or a new
reduction. It is unknown to us if such a gap necessarily exists.
5 Reducing bit commitment to (γ, δ)-UNC
5.1 Preliminaries
Our commitment protocol makes extensive use of t-universal hash
functions, first introduced in [10]; we use the following slightly
stronger notion that has become more or less standard. Given a
domain D and a range R, a t-universal family of hash functions is
a distribution H on a set of functions {hi} such that for any dis-
tinct X1, . . . , Xt ∈ D, if h is chosen according to H, the induced
distribution on (h(X1), . . . , h(Xt)) is uniform over R
t. For our ap-
plication, D = {0, 1}k, R = {0, 1}l, for some k, l. For any k and l,
there exists a t-universal family of hash functions whose functions
may be represented using poly(k, t) bits, and for which the opera-
tions of sampling h from the distribution and computing h(X) may
be performed in poly(k, t) time. Hence, we will speak of one party
“sending” a function, abstracting all representational details.
Given two bit-sequences X and X ′, let d(X,X ′) denote their
Hamming distance, i.e., the number of places where they differ. We
will use distance as shorthand for Hamming distance.
There is a huge body of literature on universal hash functions
and their use in cryptography. Despite superficial differences, our
method is quite similar to that of [16].
5.2 What we need to achieve
Note that it suffices to produce a protocol for committing to x = r
for a random bit r; as a standard trick one can commit to y = b
by revealing b′ = b ⊕ r and defining y = x ⊕ b′. For the rest of the
discussion, we analyze the case of committing to random values. We
also allow the receiver to reject even though the commiter followed




On a high level, our (weak) commitment protocol consists of the
following steps. First, C sends string X over the noisy channel to C.
R queries C about the value of hi(X) for i = 1, 2. Finally, C chooses
a hash function h and designates h(X) as the random committed
value. To reveal a bit, C sends X to R. R accepts if X is close to
the received value and is consistent with the queried hash values.
Protocol Commit(γ, δ, k)
Define d0 by γ(1 − d0) + (1 − γ)d0 = δ and let d1 = (d0 + γ)/2,









i.e., ` is the log of the number of elements in a Hamming sphere
with radius dk. We let d∗ = (d1+d)/2, and define `
∗ as `, where we
replace dk by d∗k. Note that, by a standard argument, it follows
that `− `∗ > ck for some constant c as k grows sufficiently large.
Let H,H1,H2 be canonical 64k-universal families of hash func-
tions from {0, 1}k to {0, 1}, {0, 1}`∗, {0, 1}`−`∗.
1. C uniformly chooses X = x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}k and sends X to




2. For i = 1 to 2
R chooses hi ← Hi and sends hi to C.
C sends yi = hi(X) to R.
3. C chooses h←H and sends h to C. The committed bit is defined
as h(X).
Protocol Open(γ, δ, k)
Let δ′ = γ(1− d1) + (1− γ)d1 and let X,X ′, y1, y2, h, h1, h2, d0, d1
and d be as in the execution of Commit for the bit to be opened.
1. C sends X to R.
2. R rejects if yi 6= hi(X) for any i or if d(X,X ′) ≥ δ′k locations.
Otherwise, R accepts the committed value of h(X).
5.4 Analysis of the protocols
We first observe that the protocol behaves correctly if both parties
are honest. For the rest of this discussion, “negligible” means smaller
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than 1/kc, for any c, as k grows sufficiently large and “almost always”
means with probability negligibly close to 1. Proofs of some of the
Lemmata below are sketched in Section B in the appendix.
Lemma 7. If C and R both correctly execute Commit and Open,
then R accepts the value r = h(X) almost always (where h and X
are as generated by C during Commit.
We next show that the commiter has only a negligible probability
of breaking the commitment scheme.
Lemma 8. Regardless of C’s strategy for generating X,(h1, y1),
(h2, y2) during Commit, there will almost certainly be at most one
string, denoted X∗, that C can send R with a nonnegligible probabil-
ity of acceptance.
Hence, C is committed to h(X∗). Note that C can ensure that
h(X∗) is not random, but this does not constitute a break of the
commitment scheme. In the reduction from a standard commitment
protocol to a random-bit commitment protocol, C and only C ben-
efits from the randomness of the committed bit.
Proof sketch We first define a set of viable X∗ that C can reason-
ably send during the Open protocol.
Definition 1. Given X, (h1, y1), (h2, y2). We say that X
∗ is viable if
it differs from X in at most d∗k places and yi = hi(X
∗) for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 1. If X∗ is not viable, then C will accept X∗ with neg-
ligible probability, where the probability is taken over the behavior of
the noisy channel.
We can view the process of generating (hi, yi) as progessively
constraining and shrinking the viable set S. Initially, the viable set
S consists of those strings whose distance from X is at most d∗k .
We use the following result by Rompel [17]
Lemma 9. Let X1, ..., Xn be a set of t-wise independent random
variables taking 0/1 values. Let X =
∑
iXi, and µ = E(X). Then
for any A > 0,





Fix any string y ∈ {0, 1}`∗, and define Xi as Xi = 1 iff the i’th
viable string is mapped to y by h1; Xi = 0 otherwise. Then clearly,
µ = 1. We will apply the above lemma with t = 4k and A = t2,
and we will say that y is bad if its preimage under h1 has more than
t3 viable strings in it. The lemma can be used because the Xi’s by
construction are 64k > t-wise independent. It immediately implies
that the probability that y is bad is at most 2−t/2. The probability
that ANY y is bad is at most 2`
∗ ≤ 2k times larger, so since we
have chosen t = 4k, even this last probability becomes exponentially
small (in k). So except with exponentially small probability, at most
t3 = 64k viable strings remain. The final constraint added is the
value of h2(X). Since h2 is 64k-universal and ` − `∗ > ck, we can
view this constraints as assigning at least ck random bits to each
string X∗ ∈ S. In order for two strings X∗1 , X∗2 ∈ S to both remain
viable, they must both receive the same bit sequence; the probability
of this occurring for any such pair is negligible. ut
Finally, we show that after Commit, R can predict r with only a
small edge.
Lemma 10. At the conclusion of Commit, the expected amount of
information R holds about h(X) is exponentially small in k.
6 Reducing 1–2 OT to (γ, δ)-UNC
We first reduce 1–2 OT to (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC by a reduction secure
against passive adversaries. The reduction is a straightforward adap-
tation of a reduction of Crépeau and Kilian [9] that builds 1–2 OT
from a BSC. The same procedure is then shown to reduce 1–2 OT to
(γ, δ)-UNC. Bit commitments can finally be used to tolerate active
adversary for the same price.
In appendix A, reduction WOTfromPassiveUNC is described. Given
a (δ, γ)-PassiveUNC, it produces a (p(δ, γ), q(δ, γ), ε(δ))-WOT W
that can be used in reduction SREε. Using lemma 5, 1–2 OT can be
obtained from any (δ, γ)-PassiveUNC that satisfies p(δ, γ)+q(δ, γ)+
2ε(δ) ≤ 0.45. Unlike the bit commitment case, we were not able to
show that as soon as the unfairness of the PassiveUNC is not simu-
latable then 1–2 OT is possible. Nevertheless, the next lemma gives
a partial answer leaving a ”grey” area of values for γ, δ where nei-
ther the impossibility result, nor our reduction applies. Due to space
limitations, we refer the reader to [11] for the proof of next lemma.
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Lemma 11. There exists a reduction secure against passive cheating
of 1–2 OT to (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC such that α3β3(1 − ζ(1 − α)) >
0.775+ε(δ)
1−ε(δ) where ε(δ) =
δ2








To give a numerical example, when δ = .075, one can reduce 1–2 OT
to (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC for γ ≈ .06; no such reduction is possible for
γ < .039.
The reduction is also secure when a (γ, δ)-UNC is used instead of
a (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC. Lemmata 12 and 13 establish this fact. First,
we define a (γ, δ)-SemiPassiveUNC adversary as an adversary acting
upon a (γ, δ)-UNC with the noise level of all transmissions set to
γ. In addition, if the adversary wants to send the bit b, (s)he picks
a random bit r such that Pr (r = 1) = (δ − γ)/(1 − 2γ) and sends
b′ = b ⊕ r through the UNC (with the noise level sets to γ). The
following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 12. Any secure reduction to a (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC is also a
secure reduction to a (γ, δ)-SemiPassiveUNC.
Lemma 13. Any secure reduction to a (γ, δ)-SemiPassiveUNC is a
secure reduction to a (γ, δ)-UNC.
Proof (sketch). The only possibility not directly simulatable by a
SemiPassiveUNC, is for the sender to lower the noise level of a UNC
transmission. This clearly is of no help since this only increases the
information of the receiver. The only problem that might arise is to
break the correctness of the reduction. This cannot happen since a
curious receiver has anyway access to this information. ut
Any reduction of 1–2 OT to PassiveUNC that is secure against
passive cheating can handle the case of active cheating as well by
proceeding along the same lines as [5]. To briefly sketch the con-
struction, we first note that once A and B get a bit commitment
scheme, they can prove in ZK that they followed the protocol hon-
estly [12]. One problem, is to show that a bit sent through the noisy
channel is the one that the sender is supposed to have selected ac-
cording the protocol. Similarly, the receiver should be able to prove
that he uses the bits received through the channel according the pro-
tocol description. This can be solved by using bit commitments in
a cut and choose protocol ensuring the receiver that the sender is
committed to the transmitted value. The same method can be used
to make sure that the receiver is committed to what has been re-
ceived. The result being that from an UNC (resp. PassiveUNC) and
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a bit commitment scheme, a committed UNC (resp. PassiveUNC)
is built. It is easy to devise a polynomial time protocol that given
a (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC produces a (γ, δ + 1
p(n)
) committed UNC (resp.
PassiveUNC) where p(n) is any polynomial in the security parame-
ter n. The resulting committed transfer is then used to prove that
the bit sent and received have been chosen properly. Using lemmata
12 and 13 and the above argument leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Lemma 11 applies against active adversaries for both
the (γ, δ)-PassiveUNC and the (γ, δ)-UNC.
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A WOT from PassiveUNC
In this appendix, we give the reduction of WOT to PassiveUNC.
Protocol WOTfromPassiveUNC(b0, b1)(c)
1. A picks x, y ∈R {0, 1},
2. A sends (xx, yy) through the PassiveUNC(γ, δ) and B receives (x̂x̂′, ŷŷ′),
3. If B receives (x̂⊕ x̂′, ŷ ⊕ ŷ′) /∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} then they go to step 1.
4. B announces w such that
– w = 0 if ((x̂⊕ x̂′ = 0) ∧ (c = 0)) ∨ ((ŷ ⊕ ŷ′ = 0) ∧ (c = 1))
– w = 1 if ((x̂⊕ x̂′ = 0) ∧ (c = 1)) ∨ ((ŷ ⊕ ŷ′ = 0) ∧ (c = 0))
5. A announces
– (a, b) = (x⊕ b0, y ⊕ b1) if w = 0,
– (a, b) = (y ⊕ b0, x⊕ b1) if w = 1,
6. B computes
– b0 = a⊕ x̂ if c = 0 and w = 0,
– b0 = a⊕ ŷ if c = 0 and w = 1,
– b1 = b⊕ ŷ if c = 1 and w = 0,
– b1 = b⊕ x̂ if c = 1 and w = 1.
B Proofs from Section 5
Proof Sketch of Lemma 7 By inspection, if R accepts it will
always recover r = h(X) (assuming C is good), and R will only reject
if X and X ′ differ in at least δ′k places. Now, since δ < 2γ(1 − γ),
d0 < d1 < γ and hence δ
′ > δ. However, for each i, x′i 6= xi with
independent probability at most δ, so by a standard Chernoff bound,
the probability that x′i 6= xi in δ′k is negligible in k. Note that by
the universality of H, r is distributed uniformly over {0, 1}. ut
Proof Sketch of Proposition 1 Clearly, R will reject if yi 6=
hi(X
∗). Suppose that X∗ differs fromX in d∗k places and the channel
flips each bit with probability at least γ. Then X∗ and X ′ will differ
in at least δ∗k expected places, where δ∗ = γ(1−d∗)+(1−γ)d∗ > δ′.
By a standard Chernoff bound, they will almost always differ in more
than δ′k places, causing R to reject. ut
Proof Sketch of Lemma 10 First, we conceptually give R the
value of d(X ′, X); this can only help R. Let set S denote those Xs of
the given distance; after receiving X ′, each X ∈ S is equally likely.
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We first observe that for some constant c1 > 0, H(X
′, X)−dn ≥ c1n
almost always; it follows that for some constant c2 > 0, |S|/2` ≥ 2c2k.
Now, after receiving X ′, R can obtain h1(X), h2(X). Note that
we cannot assume these functions are chosen randomly. Still, con-
ceptually, we can view R as flipping its random coins (if it uses any)
and then constructing a (quite shallow) decision tree. Each interior
vertex v is labelled with a hash function h to be sent to C; the edges
from v to its children correspond to the possible answers C might
give (2`
∗
possibilities in the first level, 2`−`
∗
in the second).
For every vertex v in the tree we define the set Sv as those X ∈ S
that are consistent with the sequence of hash functions and answers
given on the path from the root vertex to v. We can view Step 2 of
Commit as a traversal from the root of the tree to a leaf l.
By a simple probability argument, the probability that a given
leaf l is reached is |Sl|/|S|, and the conditional distribution on X is
uniform over Sl. Since the tree has only 2
` leaves, the probability of
reaching a leaf l with |Sl| < 2c2k/2 is at most 2−c2k/2; we can safely
ignore this event. On the other hand, in every case where |Sl| ≥
2c2k/2, it follows immediately from the privacy amplification result
in [1] that R’s expected information about h(X) is exponentially
small. ut
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